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T here is no dispute that high deductible, consumer-directed health care (CDHC) plans are on the leading
edge of market-based health insurance reform. The goal of
these lower-priced health plans is to induce individuals to be
more cost-conscious when consuming care, with the expecta-
tion that enhanced patient accountability will result in overall
cost savings. Almost every available version of CDHC plans
unwarrantedly connects the advantages of a better-informed
patient population (a socially desirable outcome) to higher
out-of-pocket expenditures for beneficiaries (uncertain desir-
ability). This clear, yet avoidable, link between enhanced
consumerism and increased cost sharing demonstrates a
greater urgency for stakeholders to use CDHC plans more as
a mechanism to constrain health care cost growth than as a
tool to achieve improvements in access or quality of care.
We agree strongly with Woolhandler and Himmelstein’s
basic premise that high levels of patient cost sharing across
all services will have deleterious clinical consequences, partic-
ularly for those with a preexisting medical condition and/or
minimal disposable income.1
From a financial perspective, cost sharing approaches aim
to control spending by making patients pay more at the point
of service. Ideally, higher patient deductibles would discourage
only the utilization of low-value care. For this important
assumption to be achieved, patients must be able to distin-
guish between high-value and low-value interventions. How-
ever, when this ability to distinguish among services does not
occur, increased cost sharing has an important negative
component. A large and growing body of evidence demon-
strates that, in response to increased cost sharing, patients
decrease the use of life-saving interventions (e.g., immuniza-
tions, cancer screening, essential prescription drug use) and
likely have worse health outcomes as a result.2–5 Thus, the
alignment of clinical and financial incentives is a necessary
component to insure the attainment of an efficient delivery
system. The status quo has been unable to align quality
improvement and cost containment initiatives. In fact, in some
instances they actually compete with one another, contribut-
ing directly to inefficiency.6
In 2001, in response to the adverse clinical effects of “across
the board” cost shifting – as is the case in CDHC plans – we
proposed an approach to base a patient’s out-of-pocket contri-
bution on the value – not the cost – of the clinical intervention.7
This concept, now referred to as “value-based insurance
design” [VBID],8,9 recognizes that the levels of evidence and
the resultant value of various clinical services differ (e.g.,
screening for colon cancer compared to screening for ovarian
cancer), and the value of any specific intervention varies across
patient groups (e.g., colonoscopy for a 55-year-old with a first-
degree relative with colon cancer as compared to a low-risk 35-
year-old Today Show viewer). In this setting, cost sharing is still
utilized, but in a “clinically sensitive” way, explicitly designed to
mitigate the adverse health affects of high out-of-pocket
expenditures. High-value services have no or minimal out-of-
pocket costs; the converse is true for low-value services.
While there certainly are merits to greater individual
autonomy in the purchasing of health care services, informa-
tion gaps preclude informed decision making in many
instances. A feasible way to attain the much needed financial
effects of cost sharing and avoid the adverse clinical con-
sequences of cost sharing would be to add an evidence-based
“VBID waiver” to high deductible CDHC plans. This would
entail that certain highly valued services be provided to
beneficiaries with little or no out-of-pocket expense. Until the
much-discussed information technology infrastructure is
established in this country that will allow consumers better
access to unbiased information of quality and cost of care, it is
our view that purchasers, health plans, and policy makers
insist that CDHC plans include safeguards against unwanted
clinical effects that are directly related to misaligned financial
incentives. While there is likely going to be considerable debate
regarding the designation of high-value medical interventions
eligible for copay relief, there are numerous services already
identified by disease management programs, pay-for-perfor-
mance initiatives, and health plan accrediting organizations
such as the National Committee for Quality Assurance.
This CDHC/VBID approach may be viewed as “soft paternal-
ism” to believers that the free market is already an efficient
allocator of health care resources. From the financial perspec-
tive, this hybrid strategy may increase expenditures slightly
compared to a standard CDHC plan, but at least the payerPublished online April 6, 2007
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would be assured that these added costs were incurred for
services of the highest clinical value, some of which may save
money in the long term as a result of improved health outcomes.
While we agree with Woolhandler and Himmelstein’s asser-
tions that quality of care will be diminished and existing health
disparities would be worsened under CDHC plans, especially
for those with preexisting medical conditions, we differ on two
fundamental points. First, we believe that higher levels of
patient cost sharing will reduce medical expenditures. The
Rand Health Insurance Experiment is among the many
studies that demonstrate that when confronted with higher
costs, individuals will purchase less care and in some cases,
lower total expenditures.2 Published data are irrefutable that
patient cost sharing is an effective mechanism to curtail the
utilization of health care services.3–5
Second, we believe a clinically nuanced benefit package can
be crafted that is both high-quality and affordable. Our intent
is not to argue that markets function better than government
systems or vice versa. Regardless of the financing mechanism,
a viable system must include an explicit approach to constrain
health care cost growth. We believe that relying on clinically
informed financial incentives – for patients and providers – will
be useful in achieving improved health outcomes for any level
of health care expenditures. Experience by both private and
not-for-profit employers suggests that VBID programs can be
implemented in a step-wise manner, subsidizing at first “low-
lying fruit” such as preventive services and medications for
diabetes mellitus and asthma.10 Ultimately, sophisticated
information systems will tie together electronic medical
records, clinical information (e.g., comparative effectiveness
research, evidence-based guidelines, etc.), and financial data
to create “personalized benefits” that encourage value and
discourage waste. By using the available evidence base wisely
and abandoning the archaic principle that each specific service
must cost the same amount for all patients, regardless of
clinical situation, we can move towards a health insurance
benefit that is clinically effective and financially viable.
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